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DATE / SUB-CAT.
8/72

<p>1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: Tasks to be Performed by Subordinate Elements of Sub-Region 6 in Saigon's Surrounding Rural Areas. (U)</p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER: A707.000</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 17 Aug 72</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 17 Sep 72</p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u></p> <p>7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT</p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 0496 72</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 November 1972</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 1</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1D, 1D1, 1D2</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY: <i>Rolla S. Parks</i> ROLLA S. PARKS, MSG, E8 PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Michael D. Blase, CPT</i> GILBERT McDONALD, MAJ, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC</p>
<p>15. SUMMARY:</p> <p>(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a directive, prepared by L71 ((possibly the Sub-Region 6 Party Committee, COSVN)), prescribing the various activities to be performed by subordinate elements in the rural areas surrounding Saigon ((possibly during the remaining part of 1972)).</p> <p>-----</p> <p>(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 17 Sep 72 in South Vietnam (YS025935; RVN MR 3) by the 148th RF Co, RVN MR 3. The document was received at CDEC on 11 Oct 72, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 50,348, dated 13 Oct 72, under CDEC Document Log Number 10-1137-72. Translation was initiated by CDEC.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT FOR CAPTURE DATA, ALL REFERENCES TO THE COMBINED DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER (CDEC), CDEC PERSONNEL, CDEC COMMENTS, LOG NUMBERS, REMARKS INDICATED BY DOUBLE PARENTHESES, AND THE DECIPHERING OF CODE WORDS, COVER DESIGNATORS, AND ENEMY UNITS, WAS DECLASSIFIED ON 8 NOV 72 BY <i>Capt Michael D. Blase</i> <i>for</i> DIR, US ELM, CDEC. THIS</p>	

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HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON MICROFILM

----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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17 Aug 72

DIRECTIVE FROM L71 ((POSSIBLY THE SUB-REGION
6 PARTY COMMITTEE, COSVN))

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE RURAL AREAS OF L71
((POSSIBLY SUB-REGION 6))

II. SPECIFIC MISSIONS

III. GENERAL CONCLUSION

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RURAL AREAS ((IN SR 6)) AND FRIENDLY ((VC/NVA))
ADVANTAGES

Comments

1. These rural areas surround key enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) agencies located in Saigon. Thus, the enemy has established a strong defensive system consisting of security belts from inside the city ((Saigon)) to surrounding areas.

This defense enables the enemy to react promptly and flexibly.

To perfect communication lines and establish a system for the relocation of refugees ((from communism)), a system of factories, military bases, and posts has been built. The enemy has levelled the ground and proceeded to reconstruct some areas and establish industrial areas, etc ... ((sic)).

((In these rural areas)), there are some areas which have been controlled by the enemy for a long time. The "white" areas and liberated hamlets and villages have been subjected to enemy attacks under the guidance of ((VC)) defectors.

The number of families whose sons have been conscripted by the enemy ((in these areas)) is numerous, and enemy espionage activities are very complicated. This requires us to pay great attention to these families and use psychological measures to win them over. (This number of people has critically increased since the nine-year ((anti-French)) resistance).

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Our cadre operating under legal and illegal status in these rural areas ((of Saigon)) are inadequate and most of them are military personnel. In some areas, they are not local inhabitants but "Type C" recruits ((meaning recruits from NVN)).

Our weakness is that the number of local natives that have been trained, so far, to operate ((in their local areas)) is insufficient. Thus, our

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((underground)) agents operating inside ((GVN controlled areas)) are too few to be able to either rely on or provide support to the outside forces ((meaning in VC controlled areas)).

Therefore, we must develop our in-place forces and enable them to carry out all types of activities.

2. Capabilities of specialized cadre and the working procedures of ((specialized cadre)) were not appropriate with ((the practical situation in)) local areas, thus they have encountered difficulties in rallying and regimenting the people into organizations.

They have not flexibly executed directives for each activity phase by adapting themselves to the practical situation in fringe areas. In many areas, they have relied on outside forces in motivating the people, instead of using native cadre who fully understand the people to select slogans suitable to the people's aspirations in their struggles.

They have no specific plan for attacking the most tyrannical individuals and units that have exercised oppressive control over the people, or determining individuals or units to be proselyted. The armed and political forces are not closely coordinated. Unit members have not ensured the secrecy of their activities and have failed to suppress targeted individuals. They have not used the people's violence to annihilate the enemy.

These deficiencies have brought about unsatisfactory results and unnecessary losses in personnel.

The more failures the enemy suffers, the more efforts he will make to deprive the people of their property, the tighter oppressive control he will exercise over them, and the more fascist measures he will take in these areas ((surrounding Saigon)), particularly densely populated areas where there are many hamlets situated close to the key enemy agencies.

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II. THREE DIFFERENT RURAL AREAS IN GIA DINH PROVINCE

1. City outskirts

2. Surrounding rural areas

3. Intermediary areas ((meaning the areas situated between the city outskirts and VC base areas))

Each of these areas has different characteristics.

The outskirts are the buffer zone which link the rural areas with the city. The workers were mostly concentrated there, and they inherited the revolutionary tradition. The enemy's control in these areas is relatively loose.

The surrounding rural areas cover the largest area ((among the three cited areas)) and have a large population consisting of workers and farmers. Most of the people live by farming. Thus, they have longed for liberating themselves (and disregarded enemy regulations and laws). They were previously distributed land .

If we resourcefully and properly implement appropriate operating procedures and know how to closely coordinate the three-pronged attacks in these surrounding rural areas, we will steadily strengthen our forces and hold a superior position. The foundation of our activities there is the people's violence and secret guerrillas and fifth-columnists planted in enemy ranks. In addition to our agents, more enemy troops will adopt a neutral attitude, and we will gradually proselyte them to side with us.

These surrounding rural areas are the main objective areas, since they have a population of 1,000,000 people.

The intermediary areas are close to liberated and base areas. These areas are small and thinly populated but of great importance since friendly forces have been concentrated there for operations. Therefore, the enemy has conducted air and artillery strikes and levelled the the ground, creating many difficulties for us in billeting and transportation. However, since 1970, the enemy activities have reduced.

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To change the balance of forces ((between the RVNAF and the VC)) we must:

Coordinate military activities with political and military proselyting activities and motivate a large number of people to participate in ((political)) movements.

In general, our troops must have combat plans and methods prepared. It is a requirement that attacks should always be conducted in accordance with the prescribed criteria and requirements.

Our troops must be lightly equipped to facilitate their movement (when dispersing or concentrating).

They must attack only targeted individuals but keep enemy personnel subjected to proselyting.

The main purpose of military attacks is to support political movements and military proselyting activities to motivate enemy troops to side with the people and to rally politically non-aligned individuals.

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They must know how to conduct three-pronged attacks in close coordination with and under the leadership of Party committees.

It is necessary that we should take advantage of our ((favorable)) position in the battlefield in the rural areas ((Saigon)) to prepare a superior posture in local areas ((meaning the intermediary areas)) where the people's movement is widely developed and the mass of the people participating in this movement is the main source of violence. However, we should not rely on the cited advantages on the general battlefield and become inactive, since this may result in critical losses.

In the immediate future, the enemy will suffer more failures and withdraw to these areas to exercise his oppressive control over the people. This is the main enemy weakness.

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III. MISSIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE SURROUNDING RURAL AREAS

1. In these areas, we must urgently motivate the people to unite to oppose the enemy conscription, troop upgrading, and looting and demand freedom to engage in farm production, permission to return to their former villages, and their legitimate rights.

We must organize the people into semi-legal organizations and gradually strengthen Party and Group organizations and all agencies.

Our immediate requirement is to loosen the enemy's oppressive control. We must rely on the people to destroy the enemy's oppressive control.

We must denounce tyrants and motivate the people to isolate politically non-aligned persons,

We must also isolate tyrants' families. In addition, we must use the people's violence to deepen their dissension between tyrants and use our fifth-columnists to kill them.

We must motivate the people to break the enemy's oppressive control, point out enemy spies, and oppose enemy personnel who cause confusion among the people.

We must categorize those who are tyrannical and non-tyrannical among the Puppet troops and Government. We must motivate the people to break the enemy's oppressive control to promote their prestige and lower the enemy's ((prestige)). We must make them fully understand their role in performing this task so that they will try to carry it out regardless of enemy laws and regulations. We must not let the people carry out these activities by themselves ((without our command)) nor use our agents instead of the people.

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2. We must support the people's struggles to control them ((the people)).

a. The people must have a high determination to struggle against the enemy in order to arouse public opinion. We must motivate the people to increase their solidarity to effectively attack the enemy's psywar schemes.

b. The people must gain control of their hamlets and maintain public security.

c. The people must unite and support one another to oppose the enemy laws and their oppressive control.

d. We must strive to suppress tyrants; establish political penetration bases in hamlets, villages and areas where enemy activities are limited; and try to win over the ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense Force members. We must also strive to improve our available underground agents and use our legal agents to recruit ((underground)) personnel from among the people for the Revolution.

2. We must activate "nucleus" cells and gradually transform them into Party chapters. We must avoid forcing the people to join these organizations. We must also establish Group chapter and popular organizations, etc... ((sic)).

3. We must recruit new agents, especially youths, and gradually admit them into the ((Youth)) Group or Party and strengthen the aged members.

We must recruit agents from among the participants of ((the people's)) movements with much attention paid to their social classes.

4. We must ensure the security of our forces and conduct political indoctrination for them. We must inform our personnel which categories of civilian people are to be secretly or openly proselyted and make them understand the principles of preserving secrecy.

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IV. GUIDELINES

1. The general guideline is that all cadre and agents ((in the surrounding rural areas)), including semi-legal forces, must operate under a covert status; and the covert forces will assume important tasks.

2. We must strengthen their self-sufficient spirit. They must rely on the people to conduct their activities and persistently motivate them to ((carry out revolutionary activities)) without relying on our forces and remaining inactive.

We must use the people to assassinate tyrants with the coordination of our forces. We must deepen the enemy's dissensions and confuse and intimidate enemy personnel. In order to implement resolutions from higher echelons, we must work out a plan for implementing them based on the situation of the local inhabitants instead of the general situation.

3. Implementation of guidelines

Our three-pronged attack movements have been participated in by a large number of the people who have displayed powerful armed violence. Therefore, we must persistently ((motivate them to initiate struggles opposing)) the enemy's major policies such as relocation of the people, conscription, troop upgrading, stripping the people of their property, and terrorist and suppressive acts such as those adopted in hamlets and sub-hamlets.

Hamlets and sub-hamlets are areas where the enemy vulnerabilities are exposed; thus, we must separate or isolate ((enemy personnel)) there through the people's movement in order to break the enemy control and rally non-aligned

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persons to our side. We should then incite the people to initiate semi-legal struggles to break the enemy rules while his troops are dispersing to other places. In general, leaders should know how to take advantage of opportunities.

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4. Slogans ((for political struggles)) must reflect the people's ((aspirations)) in each hamlet and sub-hamlet. We must seize opportunities ((to motivate)) the people to initiate struggles in accordance with their capabilities and the balance of forces ((between the enemy and friendly sides)). We must rely on the people ((in conducting political struggles)), since a broad participation of the people ensures good results.

Before initiating struggles to oppose the enemy policies, we must know which enemy personnel directly exercise oppressive control over the people (and carefully investigate them). We must fully understand all enemy schemes and his capabilities of implementing them.

We must persistently provide leadership for the people's struggle against the enemy in accordance with their capabilities.

Armed force elements must support (political and military proselyting activities). This means that they have to create conditions for motivating the people to initiate political struggles and participate in military proselyting activities. Therefore, ((armed force elements)) must suppress tyrants or conduct deep thrusts into enemy controlled areas to kill tyrants, if conditions permit. They should not occupy objectives for a long time, except main objectives, since this is unfavorable. They should only occupy objectives in order to motivate the people. They must conduct attacks by flexibly adopting three-pronged attack tactics and other combat techniques and tactics. During an activity phase, they must attack prescribed objectives only and motivate ((enemy troops)) to stage military revolts and ((the people)) to rise up against the enemy. Our Local Force units must be lightly equipped and determined to attack the enemy. They must carefully organize their attacks and deploy their troops to minimize casualties, and use all the facilities available in the local area (such as manpower and captured enemy weapons to equip their troops). They must be totally self-sufficient.

We must assign our secret agents to participate in the people's movements to recruit personnel (for our branches and agencies) and strengthen our Group and other organizations. We must provide ideological guidance for our personnel, strengthen their conviction, and make them fully understand the people's viewpoint.

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5. We should widely develop the people's struggles to create ((political)) repercussions and carefully preserve secrecy for our activities. We should motivate the people to conduct political struggles by themselves. Our agents should trust and maintain close contact with the people, especially those operating under legal and semi-legal status. If Party or Group members and agents fail to contact the people, their operation will be much more difficult.

Specific missions

(1) The requirement is to motivate the people to hate the enemy and initiate struggles to resist or completely break the enemy's oppressive control.

Motivate the people to hate the US and Puppet ((Governments)).

Motivate them to carry out military proselyting, political, and security tasks; assassinate tyrants; and join self-defense forces to oppose the enemy's conscription. They must also be motivated to join popular organizations to participate in struggles and farm production activities to contribute their manpower and material resources (to the Revolution). Motivate a large number of people to regiment themselves into organizations.

Measures: Cadre of all branches and agencies must participate in the motivation of the people and use motivated people to motivate others through semi-legal organizations. They must have a uniform plan for the implementation of this task.

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6. Branches and agencies should coordinate with one another in motivating the people. The motivation should be based on the legitimate rights and interests of local inhabitants and the general guidelines for legal, semi-legal, and covert activities. Semi-legal activities must be considered as primary ones. They must keep abreast of the performance of political motivation of each cadre in each hamlet and assess the results achieved by the people in political ((struggles)) to gain experiences.

Political struggles: To successfully motivate the people to initiate political struggles, we must hold on to local areas to lead them and listen to their discussions and what they oppose. We must try to intensively indoctrinate the people and motivate them to participate in political struggles. Through these struggles, we will select qualified persons to train and place them into "nucleus" cells or into the ((Youth)) Group or the Party. By doing so, we can admit all of them into the Party.

We are required to select appropriate slogans for political struggles and gradually develop them.

We must use the people's violence to dispute the enemy and force the latter to give up his plan which is opposed by the people.

Economic struggles must be conducted against the enemy.

To successfully conduct struggles, we must ensure solidarity, work out plans for initiating struggles and countermeasures, and profit from experiences after each struggle.

Main objectives must be presented for each struggle.

To ensure the success of each struggle, we must strengthen the people's revolutionary awareness and improve the leadership capabilities ((of our cadre)) who lead struggles.

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IV. MILITARY FIELD:

Ideological concept: How should we conduct armed activities? We should conduct both political and military activities (three-pronged attacks launched from mountainous and lowland areas)). The three-pronged attacks ((political, military and military proselyting)) must be considered equally important.

The armed activities are indispensable in the bordering areas. They should be constantly stepped up to develop the revolutionary movement in coordination with military proselyting activities. In conducting armed activities, we should lure the enemy troops away from his bases to destroy them and eliminate or disrupt them in order to establish the Farmers', Workers', and Soldiers' Alliances.

2. We must successfully categorize the enemy and concentrate our forces to fight the enemy or split up his forces to decrease his potential. While fighting, we must conduct military proselyting. There must be close coordination between military, political, and military proselyting activities. The attacks must be against the proper objectives, and the combat efficiency must be high. This will intensify the political and military struggle movements. On the contrary, only when we perform the political and military tasks can we develop the armed forces. This requires good leadership. The Party Committee must exercise efficient leadership over three-pronged attacks.

3. In the areas having enemy storage facilities and key agencies, the primary mission of our forces operating there is to destroy the above facilities and agencies. They should create conditions to accomplish this mission. Friendly forces who operate in these areas must improve their combat techniques and tactical skills, develop the sapper force, and increase camouflage and diversionary tactics. Attacking elements should be small but their combat efficiency should be high ((i.e. they must exert strong efforts to fight and avoid causing losses to the people)).

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4. The people must be used in attacking, destroying or disrupting objectives which are within their capabilities. By so doing, we will be able to develop our basic strong position, assess the people's force and reserve our forces to fight in other areas.

We must employ the people or secret self-defense forces to destroy enemy posts and deepen the dissension among enemy ranks.

5. Forces operating in these areas must bravely fight and try to avoid casualties. The revolutionary movement must be developed through combat. They must coordinate with the people's political struggle movement. Secret self-defense forces and penetration agents should be developed.

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6. Activities of friendly forces operating in these areas must be intensified. Members of these forces must try to equip themselves with captured enemy equipment and weapons obtained through military proselyting activities. This is the principle of the Revolution and our self-sufficiency policy. We must promote our cadre's and personnel's spirit of self-help for self-improvement. We must not rely on our higher echelons to procure equipment and ammunition because this will force us into a state of attrition and depletion and undermine our personnel's political and ideological awareness. We must now orientate them toward the self-sufficiency principle which is the tradition of our Army and Party headquarters.

Assistance in manpower, finance and economy from higher echelons is valuable. However, the self-sufficiency principle must be considered the basic one for the development of forces.

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V. SECURITY TASK

The enemy's oppressive forces in the bordering areas are the security and Chiêu Hồi forces; therefore, our security task ((in these areas)) is very important. To meet the requirements of loosening the oppressive enemy control, our immediate task is to increase the security activities and widely motivate the people to struggle for thwarting his schemes of sowing dissension among our ranks, detecting our underground agents and purging our internal organizations.

((We must)): Motivate the people to carry out the security maintenance task, eliminate contradictions and strengthen solidarity among them.

Clearly evaluate the enemy situation and classify tyrants into specific categories in order to eliminate them. To succeed in this task, we must rely on the help of the local inhabitants who will cling to the enemy to investigate his situation by oppressing him and denouncing his crimes.

The organization of secret security agents must be stepped up to increase the protection of the Party's and people's organizations. We must perform it in coordination with various agencies, units and Party chapters and heighten our sense of caution. The formation of security units and consolidation of the security Party chapters must be made on that basis.

We must try to provide good indoctrination for Party members, agents and the people.

VI. RALLYING THE PEOPLE

What should we do to rally the people?

We must widely rally the people to change the balance of forces in hamlets. If possible, we should operate legally. Otherwise, we will operate secretly.

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We have been required to raise the people's movement by grouping receptive civilians. However, the number of receptive civilians has been small. The liberation associations have been activated on a large-scale basis, but they have not been as effective as the semi-legal organizations were.

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The civilian proselyting branches, people's associations and overt forces such as security, military proselyting, and armed forces must intensify legal and semi-legal activities.

We must rely on semi-legal or secret organizations to recruit agents from the people and sympathizers. At present, the people have organized themselves into small groups. We must strengthen these groups or have our agents infiltrate them in compliance with the Revolution's policies. We should not force the changing of these groups into legal organizations. Instead, we should provide them guidance to strengthen solidarity and mutual support.

These groups have not been very helpful during the initial phase, so we must try to gradually improve them.

We must, by all means, introduce our cadre into enemy organizations to guide their members to strengthen their sense of solidarity and mutual support and show them the enemy's demagogic schemes and bribing practices.

We must consider semi-legal organizations important, because we can use them to intensify our activities. The semi-legal organizations must then be transformed into associations (such as liberation associations) which will guide other organizations. The recruitment of key agents for these organizations is very urgent, because as soon as the political solution is reached, we must have our forces among the people's organizations at every echelon. The liberation associations must be small and active. They must be broken down into small cells to facilitate their activities. In addition, we must organize the ((soldiers')) mothers' associations to motivate the people to provide us with economic and financial help to support the Army. The activities of this organization must be secret. The rear service and reconnaissance elements must be separated from semi-legal organizations.

The secret organizations must be neat and compact. The activation of Party chapters must be expedited in areas where they were previously non-existent to avoid having cadre attend the Party caucusses of other Party chapters.

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There must be one civilian proselyting cadre ((in each Party chapter)).

((Party chapters)) must provide guidance for subordinate organizations. Elements and branches must additionally recruit members from the people and train them in both legal and semi-legal activities.

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((Proper countermeasures must be taken)) in case ((secret)) organizations are discovered or the ((revolutionary)) movement is misled or oppressed by the enemy, etc ... ((sic)).

Development of security forces

Party chapters ((of security forces)) operate on the compartmentalization principle and are under the command of the secretary of their chapter Party committee. We must increase the effectiveness of Party chapters by improving the leadership of each Party member.

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The struggle against enemy policemen, spies, anti-revolutionaries, and Puppet administrative personnel in cities and towns is very complicated. For that reason, the secretaries of chapter Party committees must exercise effective leadership over the struggle. To be active in the struggle, we must master the enemy situation, work out plans to constantly attack the enemy, consolidate our organizations to render them strong, and provide additional training for Party members so that they can effectively lead the people in the struggle under any circumstances. (They must fully understand the enemy situation, our requirements, Party guidelines, and struggle measures.)

Conclusion

In the course of the Revolution to liberate the people, policemen, spies, anti-revolutionaries and Puppet administrative personnel are main objectives that we must eliminate. Having been defeated in the military field, the US imperialists will increase the number of policemen, spies, reactionaries, and administrative personnel to suppress the Revolution and urban revolutionary movements. For that reason, all the urban Party chapters must be aware of this to effectively lead the struggle to victory.

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Party Chapter Task

We must strongly develop the Party to attain four goals ((unspecified)) in the future. We must particularly strengthen local Party chapters because our control of the local inhabitants is still loose, many of our Party members are still imprisoned, and the number of our agents is still too small.

Some Party chapters were not flexible in carrying out activities; others did not know how to perform political tasks (motivation of the people); and others displayed negative attitudes and were shirking duty for fear of being discovered.

Command cadre did not pay much attention to recruiting youths and teenagers in various hamlets, especially in main hamlets that the enemy has not yet paid attention to.

At present, additional agents have not been recruited or their capabilities are still poor. We must immediately train key and nucleus cadre to enable them to successfully carry out the Party and Group development task. We must focus attention on training those agents who have not yet been discovered. In case we want to recruit new agents, we must select those who have good relations with the people and were active in various struggles of the people conducted in villages and hamlets. Particular attention should be paid to recruiting those who have lived for a long time in these areas and those belonging to the proletarian class, such as the workers, farmers, and youths. That is the organizational policy.

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Newly-recruited agents must have experience to effectively provide leadership for the people (on the Revolution's policy and guidelines). We must exert every effort to steadily activate Party chapters and nucleus cells in various hamlets, especially in main hamlets. Our organizations in these areas must be simple and effective. If there are other people's organizations, we must contact them to widen our relations among the people. Our legal and semi-legal agencies must stay close to the people to gain their sympathy and confidence. We must:

1. Try to perfect the Party chapter (i.e. to consolidate the Party).
2. Clearly determine the missions of the covert and overt Party chapters and end the supply of information for overt Party chapters.
3. Make all Party chapters analyze the situation in a specific manner.
4. Categorize enemy tyrants and ringleaders.

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Comprehend the contradictions between the enemy and people, especially the principal ones, and use appropriate slogans to struggle.

Requirements: Party chapters must understand their missions.

The Party chapters must make plans, lead the people to struggle, assess the general situation and the people's situation, understand their viewpoint, prescribe activity plans, control the implementation of tasks, and draw experiences for our cadre and agents to learn.

The Party chapters must recruit agents and Party and Group members through the development of the revolutionary movement and rally the people to admit them to our legal and semi-legal organizations.

We must prescribe effective countermeasures to avoid being discovered by the enemy. Following are some suggestions:

We must adopt the method of compartmentalization between two cells or two agents. Only the assignee should know the assigned task. Do not let agents form broad relations with cadre. Propaganda sessions should be conducted overtly or semi-legally. Agents who were discovered or arrested by the enemy must be withdrawn ((to VC controlled areas or transferred to other areas ((meaning areas bordering Saigon)) to receive indoctrination. We must increase our agents' caution to keep secret our activities. We must also train them on our operational procedures and indoctrinate Party and Group members, agents, and non-Party members (who are the decisive force) to learn our way of operation.

The Party members in each local area must gain experience from the people in order to be able to lead the people ((to struggle)).

Ideological leadership task

We must provide leadership for the improvement of our cadre's ideology, so that whether a political solution is found or not, they will persistently stay close to the people and recruit agents from among the people to enhance the movement.

Cadre must realize that though being defeated, the enemy is still able to cause many difficulties.

They must clearly realize our immediate requirements, foresee the future, and assess the enemy and friendly situation, so as to have a good leadership policy.

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Thoi was put on the retired list by the enemy, LB ((sic)) village (this must be rechecked).

Enemy plan: The enemy had planned to capture and send the relatives of the zealous revolutionary families to an intelligence training course in order to meet their immediate and future requirements.

((Page 20 of O.T., contains information of no intelligence value.))

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